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Abstract 
  
I have analyzed the reaction of the Implied Volatility on European style options 
regarding American equities in a short period before and after quarterly earnings 
announcements, from 2007 to 2016. I concluded that firms’ earnings 
announcements that fail to meet analyst expectations produce a lower implied 
volatility drop on options, when compared to earnings announcements that 
meet/beat analyst expectations. 
In this study I also found evidence of a general decrease in implied volatility in a 
three-day window following the earnings announcements. In what regards the 
maturities of the options it seems the higher the maturity the less impact the 
earnings announcements have on the option pricing. The options market seems to 
absorb rapidly the new information, and contain useful information about investors’ 
expectations. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of the role of accounting earnings in security pricing started to receive 
attention around the sixties, when Ball & Brown (1968) studied the impacts of EAs 
(earnings announcements) in the equity market.  
This paper will expand the literature regarding the impact of accounting earnings 
surprises on the options’ implied volatility, accessing to which degree the surprises 
(both above or below analyst expectations) have different impacts on the options’ 
pricing. This differentiation made between beating or not the expectations is a 
research approach that has not received as much attention by scholars in 
comparison to positive or negative EAs. Therefore, I will try to access whether the 
earnings announcements bring or resolve the uncertainty in the markets (through 
the observation of implied volatility on options). The uncertainty is the difficulty in 
correctly predicting the future outcomes due to limited or inexact knowledge. 
Moreover, I will also try to access if the deviation of accounting earnings and 
analysts’ expectations has any relation with resolution of uncertainty. For the 
study I will use quarterly earnings announcements. Latané & Rendelman (1976) 
said that IV (implied volatility) of the options brought rich information about 
market expectations, which could be used as a forecast tool for return variability. 
In addition, Cornell (1978) also suggested that IV was a powerful measure of 
uncertainty. For these reasons, IV seems to provide important information content 
as it isolates the option pricing from the underlying asset movements. This could 
imply that the movement of options prices are not linearly correlated with the 
underlying asset price change and, also, that the difference in the pricing could 
have information regarding traders’ expectations. The difference seems to be more 
pronounced around the EA according to Patell & Wolfson (1979). I will also 
explore the resulting impacts of the EAs on implied volatility on options with 
different maturities. The range of the study will be from 3 months maturities to 18 
months, which may allow me to capture short- and long-term market expectations 
of future volatility.  
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In this study I have observed that the period prior to the earnings announcement, 
the volatility starts to increase until its highest value which is on the day prior to 
the news release. On the day after the announcement, the IV drops sharply. These 
findings are not new. Several authors found an uncertainty build up to the earnings 
release date, and a consequent drop on the day after. For example: (Donders & 
Vorst, 1996; Isakov & Perignon, 2001; Donders et al, 2000). 
In regard to maturities, there seems to be a negative relation to the movements of 
IV, next to the earnings releases. This means that the shorter the maturity of the 
option the higher the decline in IV on the EA day.  
Additionally, I will try to show that the results between beating/meeting and 
failing to meet expectations may be different for the two sets of EAs. Firms that 
report earnings equal or above expectations show a higher drop in IV in the day of 
the EA compared to firms that fail to meet expectations. This could imply that 
meeting/beating expectations resolve more uncertainty from investors and cause 
following lower levels of volatility, than failing to meet expectations. Truong et al 
(2012) provided evidence that regardless of the news content, the EAs reduced the 
uncertainty around a certain security. 
I also studied the relationship of EA and IV on the days after the announcement 
date. The findings on a small day window (from day 0 (relative to the EA date) 
until day 2), brought relevant information. The day 0 was always characterized by 
a significant drop in IV (higher for good news). This could imply that the private 
information content made public may have reduced the uncertainty around the 
security. Also the impact seemed to be higher the lower the maturity of the option.   
This result was expected due to the famous leverage effects (Campbell & 
Hentschel, 1992) where the authors state that unexpected negative news seem to 
be associated with a higher volatility of the stock. These conclusions show that 
accounting earnings are relevant for option values, even without taking into 
consideration the effect on the underlying price. 
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Regarding the longer time horizons, I found that meeting/beating analysts’ 
forecasts seems to bring the IV back to the observed long-term values. However, 
failing to meet analysts’ forecasts seems to bring the IV to levels higher than the 
long term. This could mean that EAs bellow the market expectations consensus 
bring more uncertainty to the investors rather than resolution. 
Altogether, the richness of the information inside the option pricing supports the 
thought that options are not redundant securities. Performing this study I also 
found that is not only the EAs that bring down the IV but rather the content of the 
news that play a major role in the uncertainty resolution. 
Other interesting finding was that the higher the maturity of the option the less is 
the impact of the announcements, for both good and bad news. This could imply 
that investors look for other information on the releases rather than just the 
accounting profit.  
The next chapters of this paper will be the following: Section 2 will be the 
literature review, which will culminate in section 3 where the hypothesis will be 
presented. Section 4 shows the data used, its sources and the underlying 
assumptions. Section 5 is the empirical results where all the results will be 
presented followed by the limitations of the work and assumptions. Finally, section 
6 presents the conclusions of this study. 
 
2. Literature review 
The first authors that studied the reaction of the stock markets on dates close to 
earnings releases were Beaver (1968) and Ball & Brown (1968). I will investigate 
the option market response to quarterly earnings announcements. This study will 
be made through the observation of the changes in implied standard deviation or 
implied volatility of exchange traded options. IV is one parameter of the classical 
Black & Scholes (1973) formula that represents the implied volatility of the 
underlying asset that traders are computing in the option price at a current point 
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in time. In his work he stated that the implied volatility represents the square root 
of the average of instantaneous volatility until the maturity of the option. 
Therefore, it shows the market’s expectations of the average volatility that will 
affect the prices until the option’s expiration date, being a good indicator of the 
investors’ uncertainty. Due to the characteristics of this option valuation formula, 
such as the low subjectivity and fair precision, the model gained both respect and 
popularity in the academic and investment communities which means that is a 
good tool to apply in further researches as this one. 
Amin & Lee (1997) showed that option prices play an important role in estimating 
the underlying asset volatility and, that traders rationally anticipate increases in 
the stock volatility around scheduled announcement dates which leads to an 
unusual activity of the options market just before the EAs. This is in accordance 
with (Patell & Wolfson, 1979, 1981; Donders & Vorst, 1996) which discovered that 
implied volatilities, as earning dates start to approach, begin to increase reaching 
its peak on the EA date and decrease sharply thereafter. This effect is believed to 
happen mainly because news releases reduce information asymmetry and 
dissipate the uncertainty surrounding earnings expectations and other accounting 
information (Truong et al, 2012). 
Also, Cornell (1978) found that the IV is abnormally high around EA dates, which 
could be a good indicator of the level of uncertainty regarding the information 
content of the earnings release.  
Moreover, there are several studies that address the relation of the IV and EA 
(Easley et al, 1998; Truong et al, 2012) and some even support that the 
observation of the IV is a meaningful way to forecast the future returns of the 
underlying stocks (Latané & Rendleman, 1976; Pan & Poteshman 2006). One more 
recent way to access the predictability of the stock returns was made using put-call 
pairity deviations as Shackleton et al (2016) demonstrated.  
More research was made after these findings such as Amin & Lee (1997). They 
showed that there are an abnormally large number of long (short) positions 
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opened before positive (negative) earnings news which reinforces the previous 
studies findings. Martijn Cremers et al (2017) also showed that open put-call ratios 
quadruple the days preceding the EA and doubles on the EA days. This is also 
approached in the work of (Ni et al, 2008; Xing et al, 2010) where they stated that 
uninformed traders are uncertain about the direction of the stock returns after the 
EA but anticipate an increase in volatility. Therefore, they tend to incorporate in 
the option price this expected volatility amplification.  
The reasoning behind the choice of the option-market was that option traders 
seem to be important in the price discovery process as Cremers & Weinbaum 
(2010) found. The option market tends to be more complete as optioned firms 
seem bring more information to the market. This is explained by (Detemple et al, 
1991; Cao, 1999) where they found that traders with information about future 
earnings should be able to trade more effectively on their private information in 
the presence of options, which could lead to higher informational efficiency. This 
evidence was also proven by (Conrad, 1989; Skinner, 1989) where they explained 
why the variance of returns on common stocks decline, on average, after the stocks 
are listed on options exchanges. The adjustment of stock price after the EA also 
changes when a firm starts to have options traded as Jennings & Starks (1986) 
found. They show that intraday speed of adjustment to earnings releases is quicker 
for optioned than for not optioned firms. In addition, the most likely reason why 
traders choose options to capitalize their private information is because they 
present high leverages possibilities, lower costs and short sales opportunities, 
when compared to the transaction of actual stocks (Skinner, 1990; Back, 1993; 
Biais & Hillion, 1994). 
There is also literature accessing the news content, where researchers study the 
differences between beating/meting, and failing to meet analysts’ forecasts. This 
work will define good news as companies that meet and beat analysts’ forecasts 
and bad news as companies that fail to meet the analysts’ forecasts in accordance 
with Isakov & Pérignon (2001). As Truong et al (2012) also defined it, good news 
imply positive earnings surprises and bad news, negative earnings surprises, being 
a surprise the difference between the actual earnings and the analysts’ forecasts. 
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This line of thought is further reinforced as Kasnik & McNichols (2002) found 
evidence that firms who meet expectations tend to have their forecasts revised 
upwards and consequently a positive impact on prices due to their uncertainty 
mitigation. For this reason, when EAs meet or beat the expectations of the analysts 
I will consider it to be good news. Bartov et al (2000) further found that companies 
that fail to meet the forecasts, even if it is a marginal negative difference, will see 
their prices have a disproportioned negative reaction. So I define bad news as 
failing to meet the expectations. In this paper will divide the news only among 
good or bad. There are some studies that try to access these differences as for 
example Cohen et al, (2018) that found the market seems to rely more on bad 
news forecasts opposed to good news forecasts. Likewise, Tuan et al (2018) 
showed that the market anticipates bad news surprises opposed to good news, as 
managers try to withhold that information as long as they can.  
The significance of the impact on IV is also expected to be different as bad news 
tend to have a stronger impact on IV opposed to good news, not only on the stock 
return but also in the uncertainty resolution. The effect of negative earnings 
surprises that are also negative earnings seem to be amplified by the well-known 
leverage effects, approached by several authors (Christie, 1982; French et al, 1987; 
Ederington & Lee, 1996) where the negative news have a larger impact on the 
variance of stock prices returns opposed to good news.  
However, C. Truong et al (2012) suggested that: if unprofitable firms which are 
already perceived as risky to investors announce losses, the impact will not be as 
significant as if the firms had previously a good record of profitability. From this 
work we can observe that different kind of news made to different kinds of 
companies bring different risk resolutions to investors. The surprise factor will 
determine the impact of the news. 
There are several evidences that support the fact that investors do not always 
react in the same manner to good and bad news. McQueen et al (1996) developed a 
study in which the approached significant stock market movements across 
different sized firms. They found that there is a delayed reaction to good news in 
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small firms, meaning that after good macroeconomic news investors prioritize the 
trading of large firms first and then small market cap firms, however when it 
comes to bad news they tend to trade both small and large stocks. Lee (1993) used 
earnings-news announcements and found that small traders buy after good news 
and sell after bad news. Nofsinger (2001) further showed that bad news do not 
cause immediate trading from investors which may cause post EA implied 
volatility to behave differently from what would be expected in a perfect market 
hypothesis. Alternatively, the Hong & Stein (1999) model suggested that the 
reaction to bad news is slower than the reaction to good news when it comes to 
stock price adjustment. 
Summing up, previous literature references the importance of options on the 
market efficiency and reinforce the impact of these derivatives in the information 
discovery process. This paper will try to bring more evidence on whether good and 
bad news affects uncertainty resolution of investors on post earnings 
announcements. 
 
3. Development of hypotheses 
The efficient capital market hypothesis developed by Fama (1970) show that the 
information content of the EA will most likely lead the stock price to the fair value 
agreed by the investors, reducing the uncertainty around its price, and therefore 
impacting the option pricing. It is expected that the new information might reduce 
some uncertainty that had been gradually increasing until the EA day. However, it 
is hard to determine the degree of uncertainty resolution or if even there might be 
a possibility of an increase\decrease in the long term IV. This paper will try to 
access this issue based on the content of the news.  
Kasnik & McNichols (2002) found evidence that firms who meet and\or exceed the 
analysts’ forecasts get their following earnings forecasts revised upwards and their 
realized earnings significantly increase when compared to firms that not meet the 
expectations. This would lead to lower stock volatility as investors expect the 
company to “keep on track” and keep, at least, meeting the expectations. 
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The reasoning behind the observed behavior is that as the news content are good, 
(which can lead to an upward earnings revision), they may mitigate some 
uncertainty as the company is expected to keep on a growth path. However, if the 
news content is bad as Goh & Ederington (1998) show, an increase of the 
uncertainty about the future expected earnings will likely lead to downward 
revisions of forecasted earnings by analysts. This is expected to increase the long 
term IV and the speed of adjustment of the instantaneous volatility, as investors 
find difficult to analyze the new information, and the impact of all the leverage 
effects. For example, the credit rating might decrease which will lead to higher 
financing costs, dividend reductions or cuts, changes in the management and 
covenant enforcements. The findings of Goh & Ederington (1993) show that most 
of bond downgrades happen after a downward revision in the firm’s projected 
cashflows. 
Rogers et al (2009) work further reinforces the hypothesis as they found that 
management forecasts with good overview decrease the IV and the ones with bad 
overviews increase IV.  
This will lead to the first hypothesis:  
H1: The information content of the earnings announcement may lead to a drop on 
implied volatility on the 3 following days after the announcement. 
The choosing of the 3-day window is based on previous studies approaches/ 
findings, such as: Donders & Vorst (1996) and Isakov & Pérignon (2001). 
This paper will also try to further explore if the resolution of uncertainty inherent 
to bad news is higher than the uncertainty resolution of good news. 
Take for instance a good EA. When the news meet or beat the analyst’s 
expectations, the following earnings forecasts tend to increase as Kasnik & 
McNichols (2002) find, and therefore stock prices, mainly because of two factors. 
One is generally higher expected returns and other is uncertainty mitigation. 
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 On the other hand, consider a bad EA. The stock price is expected to decrease 
because of the bad future expectations and if the earnings are negative, these 
expectations can be more affected because of leverage effects (Christie, 1982; 
French et al, 1987; Ederington & Lee, 1996). This downward pressure on Earnings 
expectation is aggravated by an uncertainty factor. The fact that the company 
failed to meet the analysts’ expectations makes the information hard to interpret 
for investors (because it was unexpected) and therefore, increase the uncertainty.  
Once again, the stock price falls because of the raise in volatility, as investors try to 
access how bad the news are, and therefore the required rate of return on the 
stock increases. That might be one of the reasons why the financial data shows that 
large negative stock returns are more common than large positive ones, and the 
amplification of negative returns can produce excess kurtosis. This is in 
accordance with Brown et al (1988) have found which is the reactions of stocks to 
bad news tend to be higher when compared to good news. 
Those findings lead to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The drop in IV on the day after the earning announcement may have a higher 
magnitude if there is a good earnings announcement compared to a bad earnings 
announcement. 
There is however an opposing view, (Basu, 1997; Lipe et al, 1998) suggest that 
losses often have low persistence, and therefore, the impact of a loss 
announcement on implied volatility may be small.  
The literature also shows that Black (1976) leverage effect arguments do not seem 
to fully explain the increase in volatility, as it was argued by (Christie, 1982; 
Schwert, 1989). 
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4. Data and Sample 
The information of quarterly earnings announcements and analyst estimates that I 
will use for this study will range from the first quarter of 2007 to the second 
quarter of 2016. This information is extracted from the Thomson Reuters database 
(DataStream). The constituents of the study will be the companies that are present 
in the S&P 500 index. The constituents that for rebalancing, mergers, bankruptcy 
or any other issue leave the index are not contemplated in this study. Also, only the 
optioned firms are part of the sample.  
Regarding the options information content, the implied volatility is extracted from 
Bloomberg. The options chosen for the test are at-the-money options and have 
maturities that range from three to eighteen months. The methodology that 
Bloomberg uses to obtain this data is the following: as an example, if we have a 
stock quoting at $101 and the strike prices for the calls available (with the same 
maturity) on the market are $100 and $105 with 20% and 25% IV respectively, the 
at-the-money IV is calculated as: 20%+ (101-100)/ (105-101) *(20%-25%) =21% 
IV. 
The IV of the price of the options is extracted from calls and puts with the same 
maturity and then averaged out. With this we can nullify the effect of speculation 
around a certain event and, therefore capture more precisely the uncertainty 
regarding the underlying stock. 
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The IV is taken from the famous Black Sholes formula: 
(1)                                          𝐶 = 𝑆𝑡𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−(𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑2)   
 
(2)                                         𝑃 = 𝐾𝑒−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑆𝑡𝑁(−𝑑1) 
 
Where, 
(3)                                                    𝑑1 =  
ln(
𝑆𝑡
𝐾
)+(𝑟+ 
𝜎𝑛
2
2
)(𝑇−𝑡)
√𝜎𝑛
2(𝑇−𝑡)
 
(4)                                               𝑑2 =  
ln(
𝑆𝑡
𝐾
)+(𝑟+ 
𝜎𝑛
2
2
)(𝑇−𝑡)
√𝜎𝑛
2(𝑇−𝑡)
− 𝜎√𝑇 
In equation (1) C is the call premium. St is the stock price at time t and N(d1) is the 
value of the normal distribution corresponding to the d1, value that is extracted 
from equation (3).  K is the strike price and T is the number of days from the 
inception of the contract until the maturity. t is the number of days that passed 
since the inception of the contract. r is the risk free rate used.  N(d2) is the value of 
the normal distribution corresponding to the d2, value that is extracted from 
equation (4). σn
2  is the implied volatility of the underlying n that is valued on the 
option until the maturity date. In equation (2) P is the put premium.  
After this information was gathered, I computed the change in the IV on a 21 day 
window that incorporates both days prior and following the announcement, more 
precisely, 10 days before and 10 days after the EA. 
The measure I used to determine if the earnings surprises were good or bad was 
the same used in prior studies such as Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Foster et 
al (1984). It is the standardized unexpected earnings based on analyst forecasts 
(SUEAF) and is calculated as: actual earnings minus the expected earnings 
provided by the mean of analysts’ forecasts divided by the stock price on the EA 
date. The forecasts of the analysts used were the most recent ones up to the EA 
date. 
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The SUEAF will be mathematically defined as: 
(5)                                                   𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑞 =
𝐸𝑖,𝑞−𝐹𝑖,𝑞
𝑃𝑞
 
In equation (5) Ei,q is the actual earnings per share i in quarter q, and Fi,q is the 
average of the most recent forecasts of the earnings per share (up to date) made by 
analysts compiled by Bloomberg for stock i in quarter q. Pq is the stock price at the 
end of the quarter q. 
A SUEAF ≥ 0 will be considered good news and a SUEAF < 0 will be considered bad 
news. 
Table 1, Panel A: Sample distribution by year. 
 
This table presents sample distribution for data in this study. The Panel A shows 
the sample distribution of the total earnings announcements, bad news earnings 
announcements (SUEAF <0), and loss earnings announcements (actual earnings 
<0) on a yearly basis. SUEAF is the actual earnings minus expected earnings 
proxied by the mean of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the stock price at quarter end. 
Panel B presents the sample distribution by industry classification. 
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Table 1, Panel B: Sample distribution by industry classification. 
 
In the Panel A of table 1 is presented the number of earnings announcements on a 
yearly basis. Only the EAs with available IV data are encompassed in the table. 
Across the first panel the number of announcements is steady only decreasing to 
nearly half in the last year of the sample (2016). This happens because the data 
extends only until the beginning of the third quarter of 2016. Overall, the sample 
size is considerably large, comprising 15136 earnings announcements. However, 
the size may vary depending on the availability of the IV information to the 
different maturities of the options. 
The second column shows that there is a total of 4221 EAs where the SUEAF is 
negative which represents 27,89% of the sample. In the third column we can 
observe that only 804 EAs were negative which is 5,31% of the sample. We 
therefore, can conclude that most of the sample is dominated by good news and 
positive earnings announcements. The years with the highest percentage of bad 
news earnings are 2008 and 2009 with 31,84% and 32,04% respectively. These 
results appear to be related to the most recent financial crisis that started in 2008. 
As of the negative EA the highest percentage is achieved on 2009 with 12,61%, 
probably also because the financial crisis. 
The Panel B presents the industry classification of the sample. Firms that operate 
in the financial services and industries are the most represented. On the other 
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hand, telecommunications and basic materials are the least represented in the 
sample. 
Figure 1: Cumulative change in IV for options with different maturities 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative change in implied volatility for options with varying 
maturities from day -10 to day 10 relative to the earnings announcements. The 
implied volatilities are obtained from Bloomberg software and are averaged 
between call and put options for each maturity. 
Figure 1 is a graph that presents the cumulative changes in percentage terms of the 
implied volatilities from 10 days prior to the EA until 10 days post the 
announcement. It has four lines, each representing a maturity that ranges from 3 
months to 18 months. All four maturities display an increasing IV up to the EA 
day1. 
                                                 
1
 It is important to state that the data is controlled for after hours announcements. Since the data of 
the IV is based on the closing price, for any announcement made after hours, the day 0 will be the 
following day. For example, if the EA is made at 01/01/2010 at 12pm, the day considered 0 is 
02/01/2010. This adjustment is necessary because as (Berkman and Truong (2009)) show, the 
after-hours EA are becoming more frequent. 
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However, there is a considerable decrease on the following day, which makes the 
IV even less than day -10. 
As it is shown on the figure 1, the IV starts to increase from day 1 to day 3 at a 
modest rate and then further accelerates until it reaches the previous levels 
observed at day -10. This could imply that there is some uncertainty prevalence 
after the announcement as agents try to access the true impact of the earnings. It 
could also mean that the stock price adjusted to what the investors consider to be 
the equilibrium price which makes the option IV return to the long-term value 
“agreed” among investors. We can also notice that the lower the maturity of the 
option, the higher the impact on implied volatility of the EAs both for the increases 
and decreases. This suggests that the EAs shock may be temporary and not prevail 
in the long term. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample studied. The market value 
of equity is presented in ($ million) and is the year end values. SUEAF is the actual 
earnings minus expected earnings proxied by the mean of analysts’ forecasts 
scaled by the stock price at quarter end. Market-to-book value is the ratio of the 
firm’s market value to shareholder value of equity. Stock price is the year end 
average stock prices. The analyst following is the average number of analysts that 
provide earnings forecasts for the quarter announcements. Option volume is the 
average daily volume of options traded, both puts and calls.   
The table 2 shows some characteristics of the sample used in this study. The 
average market value of equity is $71,9 billion but the median is $21,2 billion 
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indicating that the sample has some firms with unusual high market valuation 
which leads to a positive skew in what regards firm size. This is expected since the 
S&P500 is an index that hold the largest American companies ranking in market 
capitalization. 
The mean of the SUEAF is -0,000774 and the median is 0,001453. The first quartile 
has a value very close to the mean of -0,000787 which indicates that there are 
some significant negative earnings surprises. The unexpected crisis of 2008 may 
explain a part of this occurrence. Other explanation might be that the firms usually 
avoid negative earnings surprises that are close to the expectations of the analysts 
according to Hayn et al (2002). They further find that companies favor posting 
considerable negative EAs when it is inevitable, giving out all the unexpected bad 
information to the market at once. This might be one reason why some 
considerable negative EAs may produce a distribution with a negative skew. The 
observation of few values representing earnings that fail to meet analyst 
expectations might impact the results because of the low representation in the 
sample.  
The mean of Market-to-book value is 7,29 and the average price of the stocks of the 
sample is $56,41 which is considerably high and expected given that the sample 
comes from the S&P 500. 
Since the S&P 500 is quite famous, the number of analysts following the 
constituent’s firms is also relatively high. In accordance with Zhu et al (2017) who 
found that if a security is added to an index the number of analysts following that 
security tends to increase. This number is further boosted because optioned firms 
tend to be followed by more analysts as Skinner (1990) proves. We end up with 
the average number of analysts following a firm of 20, with the first quartile being 
15 and the third 24. The number of analysts’ is considerably high and provides a 
good sense of the overall expectations (opposed to few analysts following the 
stock, which could lead to a higher impact of outlier expectations). 
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The average daily volume of options traded is 16204, which is positively affected 
by some outlier firms that have a huge daily number of traded options.   
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. Changes in implied volatility right after the 
announcement 
 
Table 3: Change in IV from day -1 to day 2 
 
 
This table presents the change of the IV of the options from day -1 to day 2, relative 
to the EA date (which is day 0). The IV was extracted from Bloomberg and 
averaged out between calls and puts of the same maturity and strike price.  
Table 3 shows the changes in implied volatility over a 3-day window (from day -1 
to day +2) being the day 0 the EA date. The objective is to show the magnitude of 
the uncertainty resolution over a short-term period. On the first column the 
different maturities of the options studied are displayed. The second column 
displays the change in the implied volatility from the day prior to the EA (day -1) to 
the second day after the announcement (day +2). Analyzing the table, we find that 
the shorter the maturity of the option, the more pronounced is the decrease of the 
IV. The larger drop in IV is the 3M maturity options with a decrease of 4,9% and 
the smaller drop is the 18M maturity options with a decrease of 0,079%. With 
these results, the EAs seem to create a transitory change in the observed IV (a 
temporary increase in IV before the announcement followed by a decrease in the 
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IV right after the announcement). This effect was also found is several studies as 
for example Truong et al (2012). However, the change seems to dissipate over a 
larger time horizon, as Isakov & Pérignon (2001) shown, the IV takes several days 
to return to the long-term level. Ederington Lee (1996) findings are in line with the 
results on table 3 regarding the impact of scheduled announcements, where they 
are more pronounced on short maturity options in contrast to longer maturity 
options.  
Table 4: Change in IV from day -1 to day 2 across maturity 
 
 
This table presents the change of the IV of the options, separating by option 
maturity, and whether the SUEAF is positive or negative. The range of the 
difference is from day -1 to day 2, relative to the EA date (which is day 0). SUEAF is 
actual earnings minus expected earnings proxied by the mean of the most updated 
to date analysts’ forecasts divided by the stock price at the end of the quarter. The 
IV was extracted from Bloomberg and averaged out between calls and puts of the 
same maturity and strike price.  
 
On table 4 the differences between the good and bad EAs are presented, using the 
measure of the SUEAF. Good EAs are defined as companies’ earnings per share 
equal or higher than average analysts’ forecasts (SUEAF ≥ 0). The bad EA’s are 
defined as companies’ earnings per share lower than average analysts’ forecasts 
(SUEAF < 0). To access whether the results are statistically significant, I used the 
wilcoxon signed-rank test which consists of repeated measurements on a single 
sample to assess whether the population mean ranks differ. It is a nonparametric 
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test and can be used when the population cannot be assumed to be normally 
distributed. 
The decline in the IV is higher on good new announcements comparing to bad 
news announcements. The higher decline in IV in the SUEAF ≥ 0 is -4,44% which 
corresponds to the shorter maturity (3 months) and the lower decline is -0,32% 
which corresponds to the higher maturity (18 months). In what regards bad news, 
the higher decline of IV is -3,68% that corresponds to the 3 months maturity 
options and the lowest is the 6 months maturity options with an insignificant value 
of 0,01%. This might suggest that bad earnings surprises do not mitigate 
uncertainty in what regards long term horizons. As the results obtained regarding 
SUEAF ≥ 0 are more significant, good news might be associated with larger 
uncertainty resolution. Only short-term options (3 months maturity) reflect 
uncertainty resolution in bad earnings surprises. 
Figure 2: Cumulative change in IV for 3M options 
 
This figure displays the cumulative change in implied volatility of 3 months to 
maturity options. The good and bad news earnings announcements are 
discriminated. The lower axis shows the days around the event day (EA). The “IV 
3M Good” stands for the cumulative changes in percentage terms of the options’ IV 
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(starting at day -10) of 3-month maturity options with SUEAF ≥ 0. The “IV 3M Bad” 
stands for the cumulative changes in percentage terms of the options’ IV (starting 
at day -10) of 3-month maturity options with SUEAF < 0. SUEAF is actual earnings 
minus expected earnings proxied by the mean of the most updated to date 
analysts’ forecasts, divided by the stock price at the end of the quarter. The IV was 
extracted from Bloomberg and averaged out between calls and puts of the same 
maturity and strike price. 
Figure 2 is a display of the cumulative changes in the implied volatilities of the 
options with 3 months to maturity, with a distinction between bad and good 
announcements. The building up of the IV from the day -10 to -1 is steady. It 
reaches its peak, which is in day -1, to nearly 2% both for the good and bad EAs. 
One interesting factor is that the peak of the IV on day -1 doesn’t seem different 
between the two kinds of news. This could imply that the surprises are indeed 
surprises and traders do not seem to adjust the option pricing between good and 
bad news. If private information content was represented in the option pricing the 
IV would be expected to be higher on the day prior to bad news when compared to 
a day prior to good news. Campbell & Hentschel (1992) support this thought as 
they find that bad news are associated with higher volatility of the stock.  
On day 0 the drop in the IV is more pronounced for good news rather for bad news 
announcements. The drop under SUEAF ≥ 0 is roughly -3% from the long-term 
values and the SUEAF < 0 is only about 1,5%. One difference between good and bad 
surprises is that the IV regarding good EAs starts to pick up to the long-term values 
on day 1 opposed to the bad EAs that prevails on the lowest levels for around 3 
days. On the final day of the figure we can see that the final value of the cumulative 
IV is different. The options that traded on EA days with SUEAF ≥ 0 seem to have the 
IV similar to their long-term values, the IV of the options with SUEAF < 0 increased 
to values higher than the long-term value. This could imply that bad EAs bring 
uncertainty to the markets as investors expect higher volatility throughout the life 
spawn of the option.  
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5.2. Pre and post earnings announcement changes taking 
into consideration news content. 
 
Table 5: Change in IV from day 3 to day 10 across maturity 
 
This table presents the change of the IV of the options separating by option 
maturity and whether the SUEAF is positive or negative. The range of the 
difference is from day 3 to day 10, relative to the EA date (which is day 0). SUEAF is 
actual earnings minus expected earnings proxied by the mean of the most updated 
to date analysts’ forecasts divided by the stock price at the end of the quarter. The 
IV was extracted from Bloomberg and averaged out between calls and puts of the 
same maturity and strike price. 
Table 5 shows the differences between the good and bad EAs, using the measure of 
the SUEAF. The table shows insights of the post-announcement period (from day 
+3 to day +10). In all the maturities shown there is no prevalence of the low IV 
values recorded just after the EAs. This could mean that, for the presented 
maturities, the EAs do not bring enough uncertainty resolution to reduce the long-
term values of the IV traders agree on the option pricing. The highest IV recovery 
can be found in the 3 months maturity options, which is expected, based on table 4 
where we find that the shorter maturity options have the most significant decrease 
in IV. The results are statistically significant in all maturities. Making a cross 
analysis with table 4, for the results where the SUEAF was < 0 and the difference 
was minimal (6, 12 and 18 months), we can see on table 5 that all IVs increase by 
at least 1 percentage point. (1,95% for the 6-month maturity, 1,29% for the 12-
month maturity and 1,02% for the 18-month maturity). This means that the IV for 
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those options increases until the end of the studied period, ending up with values 
higher than day -10. This finding will be more evident on table 6. 
Table 6: Change in IV from day -10 to day 10 across maturity 
 
This table presents the change of the IV of the options separating by option 
maturity and whether the SUEAF is positive or negative. The range of the 
difference is from day -10 to day 10, relative to the EA date (which is day 0). SUEAF 
is actual earnings minus expected earnings proxied by the mean of the most 
updated to date analysts’ forecasts divided by the stock price at the end of the 
quarter. The IV was extracted from Bloomberg and averaged out between calls and 
puts of the same maturity and strike price. 
 
In table 6 we try to analyze the changes in long term IV of the options for each kind 
of news (good or bad). Truong et al (2012) found in their work that roughly on the 
day 10 after the announcement, the IV stabilizes to the long term value. This 
enables me to make a comparison between the day -10 and the day 10 in relation 
to the announcement and observe the impact on the long term changes in IV. Good 
EAs are defined as companies’ earnings per share equal or higher than the 
analysts’ mean forecasts (SUEAF ≥ 0). The bad EA’s are defined as companies’ 
earnings per share lower than average analysts’ forecasts (SUEAF < 0). The test is 
made by making the comparison between the IV on the first day of the time series 
(𝜎𝐸𝐴−10) and the last (𝜎𝐸𝐴+10). 
The highest IV change can be found in the 6-month maturity options under bad 
EAs (+2,61%) and the lowest in the 3-month maturity options under good EAs 
(+0,16%). In what regards SUEAF ≥ 0 It seems that the lower the maturity the 
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lower the difference in long term implied volatility. This could suggest that 
uncertainty mitigation is negatively correlated with the maturity of the options. As 
for SUEAF < 0 the IV from day -10 to day 10 seems to increase significantly in all 
maturities presented. 
The differences between good and bad announcements on the 3-month maturity 
options are the ones that display the higher change. On average, an option which 
the underlying had a bad EA, will see by day 10 an increase in the IV of 1,2% higher 
than an option which the underlying reports good EAs. The difference reported 
seems to decrease as maturities increase, and the 12-month and 18-month options 
data only shows insignificant differences. This could imply that for longer 
maturities the accounting earnings don’t play a significant role in the expectations 
of analysts as they try to access more meaningful information from the 
announcement. For example they could be more interested in the management 
earnings call, revenues expectations, macroeconomic trends, etc. Other possible 
explanation could be the fact that there are still a few catalysts until the maturity of 
the option (other earnings announcements). This seems to be the explanation for 
the huge differences reported between the 3 months maturity options and the 
others.    
Throughout all the tables it is evident that the information content of accounting 
earnings cannot be ignored, as it impacts option valuation and IV. Options also 
seem to provide useful information about the impact of the EAs on the 
expectations of analysts about the future. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative change in IV across SUAEF 
 
  
This figure presents cumulative changes in percentage terms of implied volatility 
for options with 90 days to maturity across quartiles of SUEAF. The SUEAF 1 
presents the lowest quartile and SUAEF 4 the highest quartile. The range of the 
cumulative change in implied volatility is from day −10 to day +10 relative to the 
earnings announcements. SUEAF is actual earnings minus expected earnings 
proxied by the mean of the most updated to date analysts’ forecasts divided by the 
stock price at the end of the quarter. The IV was extracted from Bloomberg and 
averaged out between calls and puts of the same maturity and strike price. The 
data displayed is also adjusted for the movements of the S&P 500 to isolate the 
security specific volatility from the market movements. 
Figure 3 graphically depicts the results regarding the cumulative change in implied 
volatility for options with 3-months to maturity by quartiles of SUEAF. Just like 
figure 1 and 2 there is an increase of the implied volatility until the announcement 
day across all quartiles. However, the drop in the IV is different and show, once 
again, some differences.  
The first quartile seems to have the less pronounced drop, accounting for roughly -
2% of the IV long term value. The rest of them decline to values close to -4%. The 
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recovery process is also different across the quartiles. To better understand this 
difference table 7 is plotted.  
Table 7: SUEAF quartiles 3M options 
 
This table presents the range of scores that SUEAF takes for each quartile. SUEAF is 
actual earnings minus expected earnings proxied by the mean of the most updated 
to date analysts’ forecasts divided by the stock price at the end of the quarter. 
As it is evident on table 7, the sample is dominated by positive SUEAF values 
(72,11% seen in the data step, table 1). The first quartile is completely dominated 
by bad earnings surprises which could explain the smallest drop of IV on the event 
day (in figure 3). This finding is in accordance with what has been written by 
Isakov & Pérignon (2001), where they state that the drop of IV recorded at day 0 is 
more pronounced with good news rather than bad. One interesting factor that is 
displayed on figure 3 is that the IV of the 1st quartile options seem to bring the long 
term IV roughly 1% higher than the long-term average. This result is similar to the 
one found on table 6. Another interesting plot is the 2nd quartile. The value of the 
IV for this line on the day 10 is the lowest one. This implies that under the 2nd 
quartile there was more uncertainty resolution comparing to the others. This is an 
expected result with accordance of the findings of Campbell & Hentschel (1992). 
They explained that if companies bring bad news to the market, the volatility of the 
underlying will increase. However, if the firms bring surprisingly good news to the 
market there is also a spike in volatility as traders try to access how good the news 
are and what is the correct price of the stock. They concluded that the kinds of 
announcements that bring more resolution to the markets are the ones that meet 
the analysts’ expectations.  As the second quartile has values between -0,000787 
and 0,001453, the earnings in this interval are the ones that are closest to the 
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mean of analyst’s forecasts, when comparing to the other quartiles. This means 
that these EAs meet more precisely the analysts’ expectations, and we can observe 
that they reduced uncertainty the most. Both the third and fourth quartile seem to 
behave the same way, having a 4% drop on day 0 of IV and returning to their long-
term values on day 10. It could mean that the investor uncertainty is not much 
affected by how good the news are, as long as they have a SUEAF higher than 0. 
Overall, the positive earnings seem to provoke the largest drop in IV comparing to 
bad EA. Thus, the impact of positive earnings news on option implied volatility 
appears more than just transitory.  
As figure 3 shows, accounting earnings seem to have a great impact on the options 
pricing, more pronounced than just the underlying pricing. This supports the 
argument that options are no redundant securities and are rich in information 
content. 
 
5.3. Limits in testing 
 
5.3.1. Liquidity 
One limitation in my study is the liquidity of the options traded. It is known that 
options are less traded than the underlying stocks and some companies enjoy lots 
of liquidity in what regards options, comparing to others as Truong & Corrado 
(2009) find. This is evident in the data step where the daily volume of options 
traded studied sample mean is higher than the 3rd quartile.  (16204 opposed to 
8644).  
5.3.2. Outliers  
The tests presented take out 0,5% of each tail of the distribution, to control for 
abnormal IV increases and decreases led by other factors different from the EAs. 
The choosing of the percentage of results to be taken from se sample (0,5%) was 
made according to previous studies such as Truong et al (2012). 
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5.3.3. Problems with the definition of good and bad news 
Although this study is based on accounting earnings where the evaluated metric 
are the quarter EPS, it is important to remember that it is only a fraction of the 
news content of the EAs. This could mean that there is information which is 
released on the event day that is not incorporated in the definition of good / bad 
news. For example, if a company has a $2 EPS against the market consensus of 
$1.5, but the revenues were almost all made on credit and not cash payments, the 
analysts might regard it as bad news, where in my study it is considered good 
news. Therefore, some option prices might react from factors external to 
accounting earnings.  
 
5.3.4. Defining the event day (day 0) 
The data is controlled for after-hours announcements. Since the data of the IV is 
based on the closing price, for any announcement made after hours, the day 0 will 
be the following day. For example, if the EA is made at 01/01/2010 at 12pm, the 
day considered 0 is 02/01/2010. This adjustment is necessary because as 
Berkman and Truong (2009) show, the after-hours EA are becoming more 
frequent. Also, if there was no announcement there would any information 
resolution, meaning that only when the earnings are known, the analysts can react 
to them. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The studied theme of the impact of accounting earnings on equity and bonds has 
been receiving fair attention from the scholars. However the impact of the 
accounting earnings on the option pricing has not been studied so extensively. This 
study tries to bring a contribution to this less approached area of finance. I have 
examined the options’ market response in a short time window before and after 
the EAs. I isolated the IV to further understand the concerns of the investor in what 
regards uncertainty. As IV is the only variable that traders can control in the Black 
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Scholes formula (in exception to some extent the underlying price), it brings high 
levels of information in what regards the investor expectations.   
I have found that the EA has a great impact on the option pricing driven by the 
changes in IV.  
The first topic studied was the dynamics of the IV on a short time window after the 
EA date. I focused on two components: (1) an overall decline in IV explained by the 
resolution of uncertainty, and (2) the differences in the IV resolution between good 
and bad news (separated by the measure of the SUEAF). Although the first 
component has been fairly studied in the financial literature, the second one has 
still a lot of topics and methods to be explored. 
The first hypothesis of this study was: “The information content of the earnings 
announcement may lead to a drop on implied volatility on the 3 following days 
after the announcement”. I have found that there seems to be an inverse relation in 
the change of the IV in a short window after the earnings announcements.  
In what regards the kind of EAs the drop of IV, it seems to be less pronounced the 
worse the news announcements are.  And, consequently, more pronounced the 
better the news announcements are. This suggests that good news erase more 
uncertainty from the market than bad news. This answers the second hypothesis 
“The drop in IV on the day after the earning announcement may have a higher 
magnitude if there is a good earnings announcement compared to a bad earnings 
announcement”. For some levels, the bad news actually ended up bringing more 
volatility to the market.  
Other finding was that the higher the maturity of the option the less pronounced 
this drop in IV is. This might suggest that, for longer maturities, investors seem to 
give less importance to the accounting earnings of the period. But, overall, the 
accounting earnings seem to have impact on both the short and the long term 
(with higher impact on the short term). 
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In what regards the long term IV effect there are also some interesting findings. As 
good news seems to bring the uncertainty down for longer periods, bad news 
usually brings uncertainty to values higher than the long term. This effect is 
positively related to the maturity of the options. These findings meet the ones done 
by Veronesi & Pastor (2003) where they state: “uncertainty regarding a firm’s 
profitability is increasing in idiosyncratic volatility”. The results also seem to be in 
accordance with the leverage effects extensively studied by Black (1976). In what 
regards the pre announcement period, the options’ IV do not increase in 
anticipation of Bad EAs. This could imply that there is no inside information taken 
into consideration in the pricing of the options. As Campbell & Hentschel (1992) 
find, bad EAs seem to be associated with higher volatility of the stock. For that 
reason, if inside information was priced on the calls, it would be expected that the 
cumulative increase of the IV would be higher on day -1 for the stocks that were 
going to announce earnings that fail to meet analysts’ expectations. As the values 
on day -1 of the cumulative IV seem to be equal, traders do not seem to anticipate 
bad news. 
The results in this work in what regards the relation between the IV, EA and kinds 
of news could suggest that there is still a lot to be studied in this three factor 
relation. One example of further research would be: to study the IV on interest 
rates options where the announcement date is the central bank scheduled interest 
rate announcements. It could bring rich information about investor expectations as 
financial markets are increasingly more affected by the central banks 
announcements (especially after the 2008 crisis). 
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